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In this paper, we proposed an experimental implementation of quantum random number gen-
erator(QRNG) with inherent randomness of quantum tunneling effect of electrons. We exploited
InGaAs/InP diodes, whose valance band and conduction band shared a quasi-constant energy bar-
rier. We applied a bias voltage on the InGaAs/InP avalanche diode, which made the diode works
under Geiger mode, and triggered the tunneling events with a periodic pulse. Finally, after data
collection and post-processing, our quantum random number generation rate reached 8Mb/s, and
final data was verified by NIST test and Diehard test. Our experiment is characterized as an innova-
tive low-cost, photonic source free, integratable or even chip-achievable method in quantum random
number generation.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are crucial in many fields,
for instance, the physical simulation[1], informa-
tion processing[2],quantum communication protocols[3],
quantum cryptography[4] and quantum computation[5].
Under most circumstances, security is directly associ-
ated with its unpredictability and uncopyablity. How-
ever, the prevalent pseudo-random number or chaotic
random number[6] are theoretically pre-determined or
not proven to be unpredictable. Meanwhile, it is of
great significance to develop true random number gen-
erator. Fortunately, uncertainty is a fundamental prop-
erty of quantum mechanics. So, numerous studies, on
true random number generation, has focused on the ap-
plication of quantum inherent uncertainty or probabil-
ity , such as the path choice of single photon with fixed
polarization after passing a PBS[7][8]; the uncertainty
of the arrival time of single photons[9][10]; or the phase
fluctuation of photons[11][12]. And more recently, Bow-
els proposed a protocol of self-testing quantum random
number generator[13] with the measurement of ’dimen-
sion witness’[14]. It made a quantative analysis on the
true randomness of a given system. Also, Ma studied
how to generate true randomness with an untrustwor-
thy random source[15]. Moreover, Xu introduced a ro-
bust quantum random number generator via the high di-
mensional interference[16]. The generation speed of these
protocols varies from bps to Gbps. Noteworthy, all these
pervasive protocols exploited photonic sources, or, even
single-photon sources.
In light of the difficulty of integration and the vul-
nerability to the environmental influence of photonic
source, together with other flaws that impede the prag-
matic application of quantum random number gen-
erators, we focused on another intrinsic randomness
of quantum mechanics—the tunneling probability of
electrons[17][18][19], which aborted the essence of pho-
tonic source and turn to the electronic source. Conse-
quently, our QRNG could be highly integratable.
In this paper, we introduced an efficient protocol
of quantum random number generation via the ap-
plication of intrinsic indeterministic property of quan-
tum tunneling effect and experimentally realized this
protocol via the widely applied InGaAs/InP avalanche
diode[20][21][22], with the generation speed reaching
8Mb/s. Furthermore, higher speed, up to 20Mb/s, can
be reached by changing the frequency of trigger pulses.
On the other hand, a more efficient system which could
respond to a higher frequency of trigger pulse is com-
petent to augment the generation speed, as stable high
frequency voltage pulses up to Gb/s could be realized in
a precise way in nowadays electronic controlling. Also,
post-processing program can be easily transplanted into
our data-collecting FPGA, which enable a real-time out-
put of quantum random number sequence.
II. PROTOCOL
Consider electrons trapped in a potential well, we ap-
ply a periodic bias voltage, whose peak value is UH on
this system, which could induce tunneling events with a
constant probability p within each single period, and then
record a sequence of these signal with ’0’ when no tunnel-
ing occurs in a single pulse period and ’1’ when it occurs.
Here, the tunneling probability p can be determined the-
oretically [23]. Finally, post-processing of the sequence
was operated and we obtained the eligible random num-
ber sequences[24]. This protocol is also summarized in
Fig1:
We noticed that Shelan Khasro Tawfeeq has exploited
the dark counts of InGaAs/InP avalanche diode in ran-
dom number generation[25]. However, our protocol is
utterly distinct with hers. This difference is interpreted
in the next section.
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2FIG. 1: Brief summary of the tunneling-based QRNG
FIG. 2: Experimental setup of tunneling-based QRNG. 1:
Optical input channel; 2: External clock input channel(trigger
signal input channel);3: Final random number output chan-
nel.
III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
The key problem in our experiment is setup of the
electron reservoir, bounded by a stable potential bar-
rier, as the electronic realization of precise bias voltage
pulses is not a challenge. After several pre-tests, we uti-
lized the InGaAs/InP avalanche diode. Although the In-
GaAs/InP avalanche diode is prevailing in the photon de-
tectors, our experiment is totally irrelevant to photonic
source. On the contrary, we just take advantage of the
quasi static barrier it possessed. As concoluded in [26],
an InGaAs/InP avalanche diode consists four parts in its
energy band diagram. And in our experiment, trigger sig-
nals were applied to accelerate electrons in the P+−InP
section. These electrons tunneled through junction be-
tween P+−InP section and n−InP section with certain
probability determined on the peak voltage of trigger sig-
nals UH . Subsequently, we recorded the tunneling signals
and came to raw data.
Setup of our experiment was shown in Fig.2. And 3
showed the circuit of out experiment. We confined the
InGaAs/InP diode in a seal box. Hence, no environmen-
tal photons could contribute to the signals received by
the receptor module.
As we mentioned above, the QRNG source is the tun-
neling effect of electrons in InGaAs/InP avalanche diode,
which is irrelevant to the photons and was considered as
part of the dark counts in the previous study[27].
Dark counts of InGaAs/InP avalanche diode can be
FIG. 3: Circuit of tunneling-based QRNG.
characterized into 3 kinds[28]
1— Dark counts induced by heat motion of electrons.
2— Dark counts induced by quantum tunneling effect.
3— Dark counts induced by after-pulse effect.
When proper bias voltage is applied on the In-
GaAs/InP avalanche diode, it works under the Geiger
mode[21]. Under this circumstance, the accelerated elec-
trons triggered avalanche effect in the ’accelerating sec-
tion’, which could induce current signals. While the bias
voltage varies, the tunneling probability changes, so does
the data properties(data entropy, data auto-correlation
parameter and the final data generation speed).
And as mentioned in the previous section, our proto-
col focus more on the ’Dark counts induced by quantum
tunneling effect’, where the voltage of the trigger signal’s
high level UH dominates the tunneling probability in a
single period T . While Shelan’s work emphasized more
about the pulsewidth of a fixed trigger signal. The after-
pulse effect could responsible for her thesis, which is not
3FIG. 4: Mean of output data under different voltage. R2 =
0.964
credited with quantum property.
In order to restrain the fisrt effect mentioned above,
the working environment is monitored at 200K by the
semiconductor cooling system. Under this circumstance,
the I type dark counts was reduced to 500/s, which is
equivalent to 10−5/pulse in a 50Mhz bias voltage pulse
triggered system. Meanwhile, the III type dark counts
is partly circumvented by the deadtime of this system.
The deadtime system ensures that after each tunneling
occurs, there will be a time interval ∆T during which the
detector is forced offline. Namely, the after-pulse during
this time interval ∆T could not be counted. However,
due to the hardware impediment and the remnant after-
pulse, our raw random number data requires a further
optimization, and post-processing program is applied to
countervail this bias and subsequently generate true ran-
domness.
The counting number of the tunneling-induced signals
in 1s can be directly displayed on a screen. In our ex-
periment, the frequency of bias voltage pulses was set to
50Mb/s, then we adjusted the amplitude of these pulses
U until the counting number reach 2.5× 107. According
to [29], we can demonstrate our tunneling probability as
:
P (V ) = Ae
−B
V−V0 (1)
Here, A,B are parametric expression, which are deter-
mined by several indexes; V0 is the critical voltage, under
which the tunneling probability is 0. In order to deter-
mine proper voltage, we measured the mean and entropy
of output data from 49.25V to 49.5V , and simulated the
result based on the above equation. We obtained figure
4,5,6,7.
We noticed when U = 49.28V,U = 49.29V,U =
49.30V , the mean obviously biased from other data, so
we omitted them and comes to figure 5,7.
As the forward tunneling probability is too compli-
cated to have an analytical expression[23], we quantita-
tively fitted the data with curves shown above.
FIG. 5: Mean of output data under different voltage(without
49.28V, 49.29V and 49.30V ). R2 = 0.9996
FIG. 6: Entropy of output data under different voltage.
Finally, we chose UH = 49.40V . And we designed a
FPGA module to collect all tunneling data and saved
it into a .txt document. The speed of raw data collec-
tion is about 20Mb/s, which is restricted by the USB
communication serial port.
IV. POST-PROCESSING
The post-processing program is realized by the appli-
cation of Toeplitz-hashing extractor[24].
Min-entropy estimation— We measure the minimum
FIG. 7: Entropy of output data under different volt-
age(without 49.28V, 49.29V and 49.30V ).
4entropy Hm of our raw data[30].
Hm = −log2(max
x
P [x]) (2)
Here x refers to all the possible sequence that 0, 1n could
reach. In our scheme, we took n = 8, namely, we di-
vide our raw data into 8− bits sequences. And then cal-
culate maximum probability of these segments and the
min-entropy. In our experiments, Hm = 5.1204.
Toeplitz-hashing extractor— After the min-entropy es-
timation, we characterized the raw data with the propor-
tion of quantum randomness. Namely, independent 2.8−
bits quantum random code can be extracted from each
8 − bits raw data segment. Subsequently, we generate a
Toeplitz matrix T with two independent random seeds
sA = {sA1, sA2, · · · , sAm}, sB = {sB1, sB2, · · · , sBn}. m
and n are determined by the min-entropy and the length
of raw data l. And sA, sB consisted the row and column
of T , respectively.
n = l
m = l × Hm
H0
− 2log2() (3)
Notice that,  is the secure parameter, and H0 = log2(l),
Hm is the min-entropy of the raw data.
Scheme of postprocessing— For a raw data sequence d
with length l, eligible quantum random sequence d
′
can
be obtained as follows:
d× T = d′
(d1, · · · , dl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
×
 sA1 · · · sAm... . . . ...
sBn · · · sA1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
=
(
d
′
1, · · · , d
′
m
)
(4)
Here, we noticed a systematic bias ascribed to the
low peak-peak value of our QRNG. Briefly, the lower
level in our experiment was supposed to be low enough
so that no tunneling could occur and the after-pulse
could be relieved. Unfortunately, restricted by the inner
set of the driven module in InGaAs/InP trigger mod-
ule, the difference between high level and low level is
fixed at ∆U = 4V , which means that even the low
levelUL = UH − 4V , and could result in tunneling cur-
rent. Inevitably, the InGaAs/InP APD self-protecting
program, which compels the InGaAs/InP APD out of
avalanche effect, was activated automatically as the In-
GaAs/InP APD works at avalanche mode in a prolonged
period. Thus, we could see a set of 0s in our raw data
periodically.
V.DATA ANALYSIS
In our final experiment, we set the frequency of trig-
ger pulse to 50MHz, with 0ns deadtime. And the bias
FIG. 8: Upper is the result of NIST test of our final random
sequence while the lower is the eligible rate of sequences de-
composed from the original final sequence. The voltage of
high level Vh = 49.40V and the data size of original final
sequence is 5Gb.
voltage was fixed to 49.40V . As showed above, the min-
entropy Hm = 5.12, for 8 − bits sequences. Combined
with a secure parameter  = 2−100, data length l = 3000,
the random bits generation rate was 8.3Mb/s.
After a set of 5Gbfinal data, we applied the NIST−sts
Test and Diehard Test. See Figure5 and Figure6. Aside
from these two tests, the auto-correlation function is also
drew from the data sheet, as shown by Figure7. And
more details of the test data is provided in the Appendix.
It is apparently that all our random number passed
these two tests and the auto-correlation got a dramatic
decline after postprocessing with Toeplitz-hashing ex-
tractor. Noteworthy, that the improvement on the data
collection module and the optimization of the trigger
module is approachable certifies realization of higher gen-
eration rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a QRNG protocol based on
the tunneling effect in InGaAs/InP avalanche diode. And
thus no photonic sources is required in our experiments.
Moreover, with the application of integrated module in
InGaAs/InP single photon detector, we implemented a
photonic-source-free QRNG, whose generation rate could
reach 8.3Mb/s. Moreover, this rate can be lifted up to
20Mb/s with the facilities we have. Our further study
5FIG. 9: Upper is the result of Diehard test of our final random
sequence . The voltage of high level Vh = 49.40V and the data
size of original final sequence is 5Gb.
FIG. 10: Auto-correlation of the forgoing final data.
will focus on following questions:
1. Designing a trigger source with higher frequency,
shorter pulse width and larger peak-peak voltage value.
2. Seeking a more stable and robust physical system
as the tunneling source, in light of the disadvantages of
our InGaAs/InP avalanche diode system.
3. Combination of this tunneling protocol and other
QRNGs, as mentioned in [13][15][16][31].
Statistical Test P-value Proportion Assessment
Frequency 0.484838 0.993355 Success
BlockFrequency 0.984047 0.986711 Success
CumulativeSums 0.557001 0.993355 Success
Runs 0.958728 0.996678 Success
LongestRun 0.981358 0.983389 Success
Rank 0.204974 0.986711 Success
FFT 0.071125 0.986711 Success
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.814243 0.976744 Success
OverlappingTemplate 0.274627 0.993355 Success
Universal 0.084015 0.983389 Success
ApproximateEntropy 0.959407 1.000000 Success
RandomExcursions 0.592779 0.977011 Success
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.452699 0.977011 Success
Serial 0.800792 0.990033 Success
LinearComplexity 0.982786 0.986711 Success
TABLE I: Result of NIST test for a 5Gb final data, The min-
imum pass rate for each statistical test with the exception of
the random excursion (variant) test is approximately = 292
for a sample size = 301 binary sequences. The minimum pass
rate for the random excursion (variant) test is approximately
= 168 for a sample size = 174 binary sequences. As the con-
fidence parameter α = 0.01, our data passed the NIST test.
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APPENDIX: DETAILED RESULT OF
RANDOMNESS TESTS
The detailed data analysis by NIST test is obtained
by the official program ’sts’ version 2.1.2, as shown in
TABLE . And the detailed data analysis by Dihard test
is shown as the following TABLEII:
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